Level of Provisions for Asylum Seekers; the joining of a public good and a private insecurity

The conflicts in the vicinity of the EU has led to a large scale forced migration. Migration is being framed as a security issue. Not only by right winged extremists, but also in the general public debate. Although most asylum seekers are fleeing from war and persecution, the focus is put on security and economic issues instead. The enormous influx of refugees has strained internal and external relations of many EU and Schengen countries. Although most countries signed the Convention and/or Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, the execution of its contents differs wildly. This current European asylum crisis has shown that some countries carry a disproportionate large burden in supplying the necessary provisions for asylum seekers, while other nations seem to free ride on these efforts and only contribute minimally. Geographic, or economic variables cannot fully explain these discrepancies. In most literature the provisions made for asylum seekers are seen as an international, or global, public good. When an asylum seeker is being harbored in one country, he/she will not use resources in other countries. So all the other countries benefit from such a provision, and they cannot be excluded from receiving i5. The provision of public goods typically leads to under provision where smaller countries freeride on the efforts made by the bigger and wealthier countries. This is, however, not what we observe. Small countries such as Sweden, Austria and Switzerland are receiving many asylum seekers. I argue that public goods theory is unable to provide us with a good explanation for this phenomenon, because the provision is in fact partially a private good (or bad), making it a so called joint product. When perceived private benefits are high (or private costs low) a country will be more inclined to provide the good. The joint product paradigm can also explain why some countries try to decrease their own provision level when others do too, and vice versa. This is in contradiction to public good theory, but better mimics reality. This theory has been found to explain defense expenditures by NATO countries quite well, but thus far it has not been used to explain other possible joint products in alliances. I believe that by using this methodology in the field of migration politics can give some clues on why EU solidarity on this point is disintegrating but also on how and why common ground can still be found. I believe that this paper will contribute on finding new modes of governance can be found to overcome this crisis. I will test my theoretical contribution empirically by exploring the relationship between the provision level for asylum seekers in a country and several country specific variables focusing on the securitization of migration. When the perceived security costs of a society is high, the country will try and reduce the migration flow more than in countries where the debate is focused more on hospitality and social cohesion.