Gendered Patterns of Ministerial Recruitment in Presidential and Parliamentary Democracies

Do the findings from studies of gender and candidate recruitment apply to ministerial recruitment as well? A central, although somewhat contested finding in the gender and candidate selection literature is that the number of selectors and the degree to which the process is governed by formal rules affects women’s likelihood of being selected to stand for elected office. More specifically, research finds that women fare better when formal rules for selecting candidates are followed and when there are fewer selectors. In contrast, informal and decentralized processes disadvantage women. In this Paper, we explore the relevance of these findings for explaining women’s appointment to cabinet in seven parliamentary and presidential democracies. Using qualitative methods, primarily elite interviews and a database of media commentary about cabinet appointments, we find that cabinet appointments are governed by very few formal rules, but that there are numerous informal rules, many of which are strongly institutionalized. Informal rather than formal rules determine who selects ministers and the criteria that qualify individuals for a cabinet appointment. Most important, these rules are not gender neutral, but create different opportunities for men and women to be recruited as ministers. Notably, we do not find a strong correlation between the number of selectors and patterns of women’s appointment. Instead, we find that formal and informal rules at the party and system level combine in complex ways to produce gendered patterns of cabinet appointment.