This study investigates the determinants of the variation in the geographic distribution of Programa Jefes de Hogar Desocupados (PJHD) benefits across Argentine provinces over the period 2002-2005. Previous studies find an association between socioeconomic variables, electoral competition, partisanship, the level of social discontent, and overrepresentation in the electoral system on the one hand, and the scope of clientelistic offers on the other. These factors shape incumbent parties’ electoral strategies by signaling them the propensity of being rewarded with votes for each unit of investment in a province. This study suggests that manipulation of public policies in a province is a function of not only political incentives but also of incumbent parties’ capacity to monitor the responsiveness of the voters to the material offers. Clientelistic exchange relations as an iterative process expects on the part of incumbent parties the reassessment of their initial decisions mirroring incentives against the effectiveness of their social networks; hence, monitoring capacity. Manipulation of public policy will be the outcome of this process. This study employs multi-method analysis to examine this causal relationship. By using a panel of 24 Argentine provinces for each month over the period 2002-2005, the quantitative analysis finds the statistically significant variables that provide incumbent parties with incentives to manipulate the program for eliciting political support and specifies the set of civil society organizations whose regularized relationship with the incumbent parties endows the latter with the capacity to monitor the beneficiaries with the terms of this clientelistic exchange and; thereby, enables them to increase the scope of the program. Comparative case studies of four Argentine provinces take these probabilistic associations further by identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for the outcome variable to occur and by shedding light on the internal dynamics of this process. The conclusions drawn from the Argentine case are situated in comparative perspective in order to examine whether the interaction of political incentives and the linkages to civil society organizations can account for allocation patterns of similar cash transfer programs in the region; namely, Oportunidades in Mexico and Bolsa Familia in Brazil.
