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Which Difference between (Pure) Politics and Religion?

Political Theory
Religion
Ethics
Elia R.G. Pusterla
Free University of Bozen-Bolzano
Elia R.G. Pusterla
Free University of Bozen-Bolzano

Abstract

The religious dimension is increasingly at the centre of political claims – such as on identity – from both individual citizens and collective actors, and thus puts pressure on political systems, particularly on liberal democracies that, following the tradition established since the birth of modern states, have come to clearly affirm the separation of political and religious sphere. This separation between politics and religion, but also between what concerns the political-public life (vita activa) and religious-private life (vita contemplativa) has not always been that sharp and distinguishable, but it has certainly established itself through the process of secularisation, of which the French laïcité remains an archetype. This secularisation has allowed tracing both the ontological and normative difference between what is and ought to be proper to the political and the religious in ways now traceable in Agamben’s reading of Aristotelian logic. In essence, politics would have the “potentiality not to be” religious and to keep itself in “a space of in-difference” compared to what becomes religious or with respect to any disputes between religions. Such “energeia” would allow the political field to look indifferent to the flowering of some religious garden, taking care to ensure not be squatted or invaded by weeds, but not believing certain possible to obtain any fruit. It becomes then important better to understand the implications of Agamben’s normative political theory in which the political man is called to the actuation of a “pure politics”. Indeed, this proposal raises logical, ontological and ethical questions. First, does “pure politics” provide a third position in respect to religion where politics is not subject to any exclusive-inclusive logic such as in the exception? Second, what are the implications of this political theory on the ontological difference between politics and religion? Finally, may “pure politics” be inherently anti-religious and therefore ethically questionable?