A Kantian Theory of Human Rights: Innate Right vs. Human Dignity

The foundations of human rights were not clearly delineated in the UDHR, the Covenants, and all other Conventions that established them. Hence, today, there are controversies regarding, inter alia, the interpretation and the universal validity of human rights. Within this context, a great number of philosophical accounts have been proposed to justify human rights. Some of them originate from the Kantian legal/political and moral philosophy. In my paper I examine the Kantian ‘innate right to freedom’ (Metaphysics of Morals) as a contingent basis of human rights. More specifically, I argue that the former is not the appropriate basis for human rights. On the contrary, I suggest the Kantian moral concept of ‘human dignity’ (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals), grounded in the idea of autonomy, as the basis on which a substantive theory of our inalienable and fundamental human rights can be built.