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Leaving the Top Civil Service – Public Service Bargain and Beyond. The Case of Estonia

Institutions
Public Administration
Qualitative
Tiina Randma-Liiv
Tallinn University of Technology
Tiina Randma-Liiv
Tallinn University of Technology

Abstract

This paper builds an analytical framework for studying why public sector managers decide to or are forced to leave the civil service. While acknowledging that top civil servants’ turnover can bring along some positive developments, there can also be critical negative effects (e.g. loss of institutional memory and competence) which highlight the importance of studying the reasons of their turnover. The concept of public service bargain (Hood and Lodge, 2006) will serve as the basis of the theoretical framework. The PSB focuses on the relationships between top civil servants and various parties of the political system (e.g. politicians). According to the PSB, this relationship is based on a bargain between the two parties whereby, to put it simply, the political masters expect competence and loyalty from the top civil servants and the latter expect some mixture of rewards (both tangible and intangible) and autonomy in a desired responsibility area in return. Based on the PSB, it is possible to distinguish two types of turnover. First, if top civil servants fail to deliver on the expectations of their political masters (in terms of competence and loyalty – which may or may not be related to politicisation) then that can lead to their involuntary turnover. Second, if the political masters do not fulfil the expectations of top civil servants (regarding rewards and autonomy) then that can lead to top civil servants’ voluntary turnover. In addition to the PSB, there are other possible explanations for top civil servants’ turnover. For instance, involuntary turnover can also result from top civil servants not delivering on the expected (and agreed upon) results. In addition to problems with rewards and autonomy, a number of other factors can lead to top civil servants’ voluntary turnover, ranging from “push” factors (which cause a sense of dissatisfaction with his/her job and, thus, “push” him/her towards leaving the job) and “pull” factors (which “pull” the top civil servant towards joining a more attractive job elsewhere) to individual causes. The empirical study will focus on the Estonian top civil service during the period 2009-2016.