This article attempts to combine two academic debates that are not usually in dialogue: (1) Semi-presidentialism and cabinet appointment (2) leadership styles of prime ministers in parliamentary democracies. Many studies have indicated that partisan composition of semi-presidential cabinets is determined by (1) presidential preference to build legislative alliances and avoid agency loss, or (2) presidential and parliamentary power granted by the Constitution and their electoral prospects. Based on that, this article proposes a game theoretic model to integrate variables mentioned above and determine which types of prime minister is appointed in semi-presidential nascent democracies. First of all, bureaucratic and political prime ministers are distinguished. Secondly, in equilibrium, bureaucratic prime ministers are more likely to emerge under single-party majority government while the situation under which the presidents confront with the oppositions who control parliamentary majority, that is, cohabitation or divided majority government, increases the likelihood of choosing political prime ministers, irrelevant to who is in charge of cabinet appointments. Finally, regarding future electoral uncertainty affiliated with divided minority government, the best strategy for presidents with considerable power is to appoint bureaucratic prime ministers in avoidance of agency loss, relative to their counterparts with less power. Based on that, this article collects data from 34 semi-presidential nascent democratic countries after 1991, confirming those hypotheses derived from formal model by quantitative analysis. In conclusion, prime ministerial selection in semi-presidential democracies depends on cabinet types, reflecting different behaviors and strategies in respond to the degree to which current voting are fractionalized.
