In this paper we aim to analyse the effects of institutional changes on the multi-level career opportunities of sub-national elites. More precisely, we consider the effects of personalisation (the enhanced importance and visibility of candidates vis-à-vis the party in the electoral process) on the availability and attractiveness of multi-level career paths.
Through an original dataset on the careers of regional and provincial presidents and mayors of the main Italian cities from 1985 to 2015, we analyse the changing career patterns for the three most relevant political offices at subnational level. What were once considered as natural steps in a unidirectional career from the local to the national level of government, are now a piece in a complex mosaic made of possible moves up and down the political ladder. There are many instances of national politicians opting for a homecoming to the territorial level, that is no longer perceived as a downgrade. On the other hand, there are instances of politicians building their fortunes through a careful nourishing of their personal influence in the territorial constituency, something that may allow them to negotiate successive career steps with their own party from a position of strength.
Although based on an empirical analysis devoted to the Italian case, we believe our work can make a relevant contribution also in theoretical terms. Italy has undergone a number of significant reforms during the nineties. In particular, direct election of mayors and provincial and regional presidents, was introduced between 1993 and 1999. For this reason, Italy seems to be a perfect “political laboratory” to assess the effects of institutional changes on political careers through a within-case diachronical comparison.
