Three Types of Technocracy and their Relation to Populism and Democracy

It is becoming common to frame contemporary democratic politics in terms of a contest between populism and technocracy (Bickerton and Invernizzi Acetti 2015; Fukuyama 2014; Leonard 2011; Keneally 2009; Schmidt 2006; Williams 2011). Populism has been the primary focus of much of this literature. Technocracy, by contrast, has been given little attention, and has been used variously to refer to bureaucracy, elites, pragmatism, expertise, norms of impartiality, and even the mere reference to an ‘evidence base’ for policy (Easterly 2016). Technocracy matters because it describes a pervasive feature of modern rule in complex societies and arises in many accounts of the problems of populism. But the danger in this conceptual looseness is that we falsely narrow our conception of democracy itself, and thereby stretch the technocratic label over too many democratic institutions and practices. In the first part of this essay I aim to show the value of paying closer attention to the concept of technocracy. I will begin by surveying the history of technocracy and its relationship to conceptual near neighbours - bureaucracy, elites, and experts - and I will sketch three types of technocracy: command and control; Hayekian or second-order technocracy; and digital technocracy. In the second part I will argue that the framing of populism in opposition to technocracy is misleading. Not only do various forms of technocracy share with populism a hostility to party democracy (Bickerton and Invernizzi Acetti 2015); they also share a desire to use executive power to cut through the conflicts and compromises of democratic politics. In this respect, I will argue, they both stand opposed to deliberative conceptions of democracy. In the final part of the essay I will relate the discussion of populism and technocracy to recent debates in democratic theory on the epistemic properties (e.g. Landemore) - and deficiencies (e.g. Brennan, Caplan) - of democracy, and the potential role of designed democratic innovations in addressing them. I will conclude with a few comments on the democratic implications of digital technocracy - the least well recognised of the types of technocracy - and ask whether the recent wave of populist politics may itself have been abetted by digital technocrats.