Power of President in Semi-Presidential Democracies as a Conceptual Puzzle

The paper deals with conceptual issues related to the definition of a semi-presidential political systems. The main argument argues in favor of re-inserting the issues of presidential powers to the core of definition of a semi-presidential systems. Contrary to Elgie’ s standard definition of semi-presidentialism, the paper argues that we have to complete again the definition with a concept of presidential powers to add to direct elections of the head of state and a government responsible to the parliament. The paper will discuss different definitions of semi-presidentialism to show that we have to return the powers back to the game in order to grasp the unique features of semi-presidential systems. In a similar way as was used by Giovanni Sartori by differentiating between the format and type of party systems, the paper claims that Elgie’s definition is similar to format of a party system: clear to apply but not enough telling about the logic of semi-presidential politics. At the end of the paper, the author will argue in favor of the analysis of power relations between the president and the prime minister / government as the core and key element distinguishing semi-presidential and purely parliamentary regimes. In such an endeavor, both constitutional division of powers within the executive body and the real power relations in terms of informal division of power and long-term constitutional conventions between these two actors must be taken into consideration. Therefore, the paper concludes, we need to establish rather sound basis of empirical studies inquiring into the reality of the countries that fit to the standard definition.