During the Cold War, the “Visegrád Four” countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) were all integrated into the Eastern Bloc, led by the Soviet Union (SU). This meant a strict, centralized control over both internal and external politics. In the framework of the Warsaw Pact, the satellite states were not allowed nuclear weapon capabilities of their own, and the nuclear reactors were also mostly Soviet designs (which meant a strong dependency as the nuclear fuel was also provided by the SU).
As a result of this, the nuclear identity of Central European states was dominated by Moscow and it showed very similar patterns in all four cases. Regarding nuclear non-proliferation in general, the satellite states did not have a say in the strategic dialogue between the United States and the SU, discussing nuclear strategy and arms control measures was the privilege of the two superpowers.
The end of the Cold War and the fall of the SU, however, established a completely new situation. While the historic ties in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy remained connected to Moscow, Central European states were facing new opportunities and responsibilities in the field of nuclear strategy and arms control. Over the course of the 1990s and the early 2000s, they were integrated into the former Western European political bloc and they became NATO-member states, as well.
The main goal of our presentation is to show how this political shift affected the nuclear identity of Central European states:
How do they synchronize their past experience with the present challenges and obligations – both in terms of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear arms control?
Are there still common patterns in the nuclear identity of the “Visegrád Four” countries – if not, what are the most important differences between them?
