Among those supporting the realist agenda, modus vivendi theorists in particular have shown how political legitimacy can be disconnected from ‘liberal moralism’. There are two accounts: The first defines a minimal morality criterion, the second a modest acceptance criterion. These accounts’ strength is that they embrace conditions of pluralism and deep disagreement. Their weakness is that they are too uncritical towards conditions of domination. I argue that realists will struggle to overcome this problem as long as they do not move beyond these accounts. By specifying and enriching the minimal morality criterion or the acceptance criterion such that they gain a critical bite against cases of domination, realists tend to revert to the ‘moralistic’ form of political theorizing they criticize. However, I propose that realists do not face an impasse here. The problem may be overcome by a third account that introduces a core notion of agonistic democracy: politics requires channels through which disagreement and demands for renegotiation can be expressed. I discuss how this criterion can supplement the others and encourage a form of realist political theorizing that positions itself between current forms of modus vivendi and agonistic theory.
