Assessing Interest Groups’ Tactical Focus on Inside and/or Outside Lobbying in the Context of Concrete Policy Processes

Extant research shows that citizen groups rely more heavily on outside than on inside lobbying, whereas business groups rely more heavily on inside than outside lobbying. Citizen groups must lobby on the outside in order to capture the attention of diffuse interests. Business groups prefer the inside, specifically the administration, because this is where they can exert most influence. Some authors hence suggest that institutional reforms facilitating access to inside venues do not lead to a greater inclusion of citizen groups. On the contrary, they rather benefit business groups. However, existing studies consider interest groups’ tactical focus to be decoupled from the very issues upon which they engage. This article studies how interest groups strike a balance between inside and outside lobbying in the context of specific policy issues. Must citizen groups focus on outside tactics even if these are less promising for success? Or do they enjoy some leeway in how they lobby on specific issues, particularly if the group’s membership attaches great importance to an issue? Similarly, must business groups stick to inside lobbying even when conflict has effectively been expanded to the voting public? We put forward that interest groups can adapt their tactical focus if they dispose of ample financial resources. In order to answer these questions, we study eight interest groups engaged on four different policy processes in Switzerland. These groups differ in terms of group type, resources, privileged access to inside venues (administration, legislative committees), and their stance towards the status quo. But, the issues upon which the groups mobilized were highly salient to the groups’ membership. A series of semi-structured interviews with IG representatives, in combination with an extensive documentary analysis, allows for a careful assessment of the groups’ tactical focus. Preliminary results suggest that citizen groups disposing of ample financial resources and privileged access focus on inside lobbying, regardless of the need to create publicity for their cause. When membership maintenance is important, citizen groups with ample resources can in fact focus on both inside and outside lobbying simultaneously. Business groups, on the other hand, focus on outside lobbying when the voting public comes to play a decisive role for the outcome of the policy process and when they dispose of sufficient financial resources. Representing a broadly-shared interest thus does not necessarily hinder interest groups from engaging in intense inside lobbying. This implies that institutional reforms, which facilitate access to inside venues, might indeed lead to a greater inclusion of citizen groups.