Kant on Revolution and a Federalism of Free States

In the past, Kant’s infamous claim on revolution has evoked debates on whether there is an inconsistency between Kant’s ethical and juridical duties. With a distinction between the duty of virtues and duty of justice, Christine Korsgaard in the article “Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the right to Revolution,” emphasized the moral duty of “the virtuous person” to “rebel against unjust institution” on behalf of all. Within the realm of juridical duties, Arthur Ripstein believes the distinctions between barbarism and despotism offer different “grounds for entering a rightful condition and the internal criterion for assessing and, where appropriate, improving an existing rightful condition” (Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy, “Revolution and the Right of Human Beings as Such” 328). Is the right to revolution a moral defense or a juridical rectification of “a barbaric state of nature”? In this paper, I will follow a contract approach to investigate Kant’s concerns on revolution. Similar to Rousseau, Kant uses the general will as an “idea of reason,” which prescribes a republican ideal. Only a collective general (common) and powerful will, that can provide everyone this assurance. –But the condition of being under a general external (i.e., public) lawgiving accompanied with power is the civil condition. (MM 6:256) I aim to show that such contractual and public concerns on revolution compared to Locke’s natural rights approach might offer a consistent explanation of Kant’s advocates for a federalism of free states (also translated as a voluntary federation of states) rather than a state of nations (PP 8: 357).