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Limits and Potentials of Direct Democracy in Hungary

Europe (Central and Eastern)
Democracy
Democratisation
Zoltán Tibor Pállinger
Andrássy Universität Budapest
Zoltán Tibor Pállinger
Andrássy Universität Budapest

Abstract

Ironically, direct democracy antedates democracy in Hungary: The first referendum was held even before the first free elections took place. Since 1989, 7 ballots have been held, in which 13 issues were decided. Since the beginnings the importance and the practice of direct democracy have changed and its function remained unclear. It is by no mean insignificant, but it struggles with two major conceptional flaws: Hungary’s political system is extremely majoritarian and predominantly representative. This constellation prevents the development of a political space, in which questions can be discussed without reference to party politics. Furthermore, the government consciously pursues politics based on a friend-enemy scheme, in order to polarize society. Finally, the dominance of the representative principle induces the political elite to try to limit the impact of direct democracy. The conceptional and practical flaws limit the interaction between the representative and direct-democratic system. Historically, four phases regarding the practice of direct democracy may be distinguished. In the first phase questions regarding the democratic transition were decided. Those referendums helped to make a clear-cut break with the communist past. In a second phase fundamental questions regarding the country’s international orientation were legitimised by popular ballot (NATO- and EU-accession, 1997, resp. 2003). Since then in the third phase the use of referendums has changed: Parties started to use them in a more strategic way, trying to alter the balance of power or even to oust the government. Nowadays, in the fourth phase, Hungary’s new constitution of 2012, makes it very difficult to initiate referendums. From 2010 on the governing parties had a two-thirds majority in Parliament, which allowed them to enact a new constitution and profoundly alter the political system. The opposition was not able to halt the governing parties. In such a situation, initiatives could have been an instrument to influence the Government’s policy, but in this time no successful initiative was launched. Hungary’s direct democracy is embedded in a predominantly representative system, thus serving as a complementary tool. The political actors have adapted to the new created by the new situation constitution, trying to make use of the direct democratic instruments. The ruling parties try to control direct democracy as much as possible. They control the use of direct democratic instruments and also the newly created consultative mechanisms (“national consultations”) in order to increase their support. But also opposition forces have adapted their strategies not so much to enforce referendums, but to mobilise their supporters and to put fundamental issues on the public agenda. This contribution will give an overview on legal framework and the functions of direct democracy in the Hungarian political system and trace their changes. Following this overview the paper analyses the impact of the successful and unsuccessful referendums on politics and on political discourse and will assess the potential of these instruments in the extremely majoritarian and increasingly illiberal context of Hungary.