The publication of The Foreign Policy of Counter-Secession (Ker-Lindsay, 2012) usefully directed scholarly attention away from secessionist movements and toward the sovereign parent states they want to separate from. Parent states can potentially resolve secessionist conflicts decisively either through forcible eradication (Chechnya, Tamil Eelam) or by allowing secessionists to leave (Eritrea, South Sudan). Most sovereign states are, however, unwilling to permit secession and unwilling or unable to forcibly eradicate well ensconced secessionist movements. We examine a variety of different strategies that parent states have pursued in dealing with de facto states which are secessionist movements that control territory, provide governance, secure popular support and persist over extended periods of time. We ask whether different parent state strategies can promote or achieve conflict resolution with de facto states. Empirically, we investigate four different parent state strategies: open engagement (Moldova-Transnistria), tentative engagement (Georgia-Abkhazia), isolation/rejection with almost no capacity to enforce it (Somalia-Somaliland) and isolation/active sanctions (Cyprus-TRNC) and ask why none of these conflicts have been resolved. The answer is seemingly not parent state strategies as those vary dramatically. This suggests an answer that lies somewhere in internal de facto state dynamics, external support from patron states or the larger international normative environment.
