Executive-legislative Relations in a New Democracy: Politics of Taxation in South Korea

The superiority of presidential power against the legislature is commonly observed among new presidential democracies. In South Korea, after the democratic transition in 1987, presidents continue to dominate the legislative process with a strong control on the governing party. The legacies of developmental state with a strong executive leadership also contributed to the presidential power. However, the bargaining power of the legislature on the policy outcome began to grow since late 1990s. To analyze the changing balance of power between the president and the legislature, we focus on the inter-branch negotiation on the tax policy. The executive has taken the lead in tax policy because it has the expertise and the legal capacity to propose tax bills. We argue that the bargaining power of the legislature has increased even on the tax policy used to be dominated by the executive. First, after the democratic transition, the divided government occurs frequently. Under a divided government, the president had to respect the policy preference of the opposition parties when the policy coalition collapses. Second, due to the strong party discipline, it is not an option for the president to persuade individual legislators in opposition. Instead, president had to rely on the negotiation among the party leaders in the legislature. Third, the bargaining power of the president becomes even weaker when the presidential candidate for the next election emerges early in the governing party. The party discipline of the governing party is established around the presidential candidate and the control of the president declines.