Understanding the epistemic account of democracy

This article aims at conceptualising epistemic democracy. It does by introducing the main pillars of Schumpeterian democratic theory which contains numerous thought-provoking elements: common good does not exist, democracy is only a formal procedure and the absence of citizens’ knowledge is further downplayed by leaders’ arbitrary manipulation. First of all, it is crucial to understand what role the common good plays in epistemic democracy. Secondly, in order to understand the epistemic value of democracy, it is crucial to concretise the characteristics of epistemic democracy, whether predominantly formal or substantive elements constitute epistemic democracy. Thirdly, it is necessary to investigate what cognitive abilities leaders and citizens need to possess to track the common good – this highlights through what tools the epistemic values of democracy can be approximated. The Schumpeterian conception of democracy undermines the epistemic value of democracy because it is an elitist conception that fundamentally contradicts the self-reflective nature of epistemological self-rule. In other words, according to my main assumption, epistemic democracy is a learning process. Finally, the article relates its analytical framework to epistocracy, to ascertain whether the appreciation of experts encourages to get to know to the common good and develop the epistemic value of democracy or actually leads to the devaluation of epistemic self-rule.