Dysfunctional Epistemic Institutions as a Form of Corruption?

We live in societies in which the epistemic labor is highly divided. This means that we depend on experts of various kinds; because their expertise is “esoteric”, we cannot easily check from the outside whether or not we are given the right information, or treated with the right know-how. Usually, such expertise – whether theoretical or practical, as “know how” – is not held by single individuals, but rather by epistemic communities in which the expertise acquired in the past is preserved, refined, and expanded. I use the term “epistemic institutions” for describing institutions in which various forms of expertise are hosted; they include, for example, professional groups or universities. I suggest defining them in a functional perspective that cuts across the public/private divide. The paper defends three claims. First, because of its role in highly differentiated societies, expertise, in all its forms, must be understood in normative rather than purely technical terms. To paraphrase Bacon: expertise is power, and with power comes responsibility, hence with expertise also comes responsibility. Second, because of this nexus between expertise and responsibility, the functionality of epistemic institutions needs to be preserved. Its opposite, dysfunctional epistemic institutions is problematic for both intrinsic and instrumental reasons; if the dysfunctionality is caused by intention or culpable negligence, one can speak of a form of corruption. This holds whether or not the institutions in question are public or private, but corruption in private epistemic institutions can sometimes be excused because the institutional purposes, and hence the role expectations of the individuals working in such institutions, are not made sufficiently clear. Third, in order to enable epistemic institutions and the individuals within them to function in non-corrupt ways, i.e. to preserve, generate and transmit the expertise they hold, these institutions must be enabled to carry the ensuing responsibilities. This implies that they must be given sufficient autonomy and be protected from internal or external pressures.