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Treaty Reform, Budget Gridlock and Reduced Spending

Constitutions
European Union
Institutions
Parliaments
Policy Analysis
Public Policy
Giacomo Benedetto
Royal Holloway, University of London
Giacomo Benedetto
Royal Holloway, University of London

Abstract

This paper examines the changes of the Lisbon Treaty to the rules on agreeing the EU’s annual budget and multiannual financial frameworks. Contrary to expectations that equality between the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament amounts to a gain in powers for the Parliament and that new European Union treaties ease decision-making, the Lisbon Treaty has made budget change less likely. For both the Council and the Parliament, agenda-setting power is reduced and veto power is increased. While the powers of the Parliament are reduced and the budget is made less flexible, perhaps most significantly, the rules of the Lisbon Treaty also reduce the amounts available to spend.