Resistance to Injustice and Consent of the Oppressed

Individuals who bear the brunt of domestic or global injustice could sometimes justifiably resort to violent acts in order to secure their own, or other people’s entitlements. These permissible acts of resistance include destruction of property, forceful disruption of economic activities, or even a revolution. It is perhaps tempting to think that forceful resistance undertaken by the victims themselves is simply self-defense, but in fact it often involves other-protection. In almost every case of injustice, some victims would choose not to actively resist and there are profound disagreements among the population about the proper means of resistance or even whether to resist in the first place. Leaders and activists of resistance movements typically claim to be acting as the agents of the oppressed. More importantly, in order to justify their resistance, they often have to invoke the legitimate interests of those other victims who do not directly participate in the resistance movement. Thus, the conventional distinction between domestic resistance and foreign intervention is inadequate and there is a question of whether it is legitimate to use force in resisting injustice without the consent of the other victims or the intended beneficiaries of such actions. Several theorists have argued that consent or authorization of the victims are part of the condition under which use of force in other-protection could be morally justified. A stronger version of this requirement states that forceful resistance is morally justified only if it enjoys the consent of the victims. A weaker version states that the absence of such consent simply means that the interests of those victims cannot be invoked in the objective justification of forceful resistance. This paper rejects both of these claims and argues that consent has no independent role in justifying forceful resistance. I start by considering the reasons why consent of the intended beneficiaries might be thought to be important for the justification of forceful resistance. I then argue that none of these arguments provides a convincing case for the consent requirement. In particular, this paper examines the agent-relative dimension of the right of resistance to injustice, and argues that rebels could legitimately use force without being authorized to do so by the other victims on whose behalf resistance is undertaken because in some cases unauthorized other-protection is consistent with respecting the autonomy of the victims especially when the victims themselves also have a moral duty to resist oppression. Next, I defend a set of conditions under which non-state actors would have the moral authority to use force in their efforts to resist injustice. These conditions include: (i) those who engage in resistance should act on their conscientious moral convictions; (ii) there should be a fair distribution of burdens associated with resistance; (iii) leaders or activists of resistance should refrain from coercing other victims to participate. To conclude, substantial support from the affected popular will significantly improve the chance of successfully promoting justice. However, the legitimacy of resistance should not depend on the consent of the intended beneficiaries.