Pragmatic Constitutional Court in Russia’s Dual State

This paper analyzes the conduct of the Russian Constitutional Court (RCC) and its chairman, Valerii Zorkin, in an effort to explain its institutional health and longevity in the context of consolidated authoritarianism. We argue that the stability of the RCC today seems to have been due in large part to the pragmatic actions (and shifting intellectual predispositions) of its chairman, who managed to fend off many attacks to protect the tribunal through his interactions with Russia’s leaders. It starts with outlining the three key characteristics of an institutionalized constitutional review tribunal - access and jurisdiction, decision-making autonomy in cases and internal operations, and authoritativeness. Then, it lays out the patterns of conduct of the Court that the two regimes (constitutionalism and political expediency), which are combined in the dual state, anticipate. In this theoretical context, we explore the pragmatism of the RCC and its chairman as reflected in its loyalty to a popular President Vladimir Putin and in its resilience and activism. Here we pay special attention to the formal and informal rules of Court operations, the court’s handling of ordinary as well as politically salient cases, and its reaction to politically salient ones, including its defense of Russian interests against the European Court of Human Rights and the requirements of international law. Finally, we argue that the Constitutional Court’s standing in the Russian political system depends on its skill in catering to the political needs of Russia’s rulers.