In Defense of the All-Affected Principle: A Realist Reply to Four Objections

My paper addresses four objections regularly made against AAP. In so doing, I argue that the AAP is is the correct principle of democratic legitimacy that helps democratising power relations at the borders. It should not, however, lead to an ideal argument for a global demos or generalized enfranchisement, but to realist assessments of transnational participation and representation. 1. AAP is not essential to democracy The fact that affection can be positive would indicate that AAP is not essential to democracy: being affected without consideration or participation is not necessarily undemocratic, since being positively affected can reinforce autonomy. The point of the AAP, however, is not to prevent externalities outright (even less so when these are positive), but to make sure that those who are affected can act upon the externalities, or to control the indirect consequences of the action or decision. Further, autonomy should not be merely an end, in which case non- democratic or non-liberal means could be justified in its pursuit, but should be built into the means themselves. 2. AAP is over-inclusive Taking AAP seriously would mean to enfranchise too many non-citizens who claim to be affected, or to disenfranchise current citizens living abroad. But this is only true if one does not define what interests are and how they are constructed. Distinguished from wants, interests should be closely attached to needs. Thus, the protection of basic interests, such as security, health, or education, indicates a hierarchy of interests to be taken into account in order to define whose stakes have priority in the decision-making procedures. 3. AAP leads to the dissolution of the political community The AAP necessarily has a cosmopolitan scope, since everyone can be potentially affected by any decision, in one way or another. Such an extension of the demos could destroy what makes it a demos, i.e. the identification of the members with one another, some shared common convictions, interpersonal trust and stability of its composition. APP, however, does not necessarily require redesigning political communities. Rather, it can be implemented incrementally through already existing institutions and new modes of representation. First, reciprocal or surrogate representation remain realist aspirations for voicing transnational claims based on affected interests. Self-appointed representatives may also have better results than global enfranchisement. 4. AAP undermines self-determination It has been argued that considering foreign interests, especially when dealing with migration policies, goes against the right to self-determination. There is a strong interest in self-determination for citizens, and immigration notably affects this interest, which gives a prima facie claim for citizens to decide unilaterally about their borders. The counter-argument has mainly considered a moral right to justification, which should bypass self-determination. I argue that the problem lies in the definition of self-determination itself. One should distinguish between self-determination as non-domination and self-determination as non-interference: as non-interference, it fits perfectly with the nationalist view. As non-domination, it means taking into consideration relations of domination along the borders, and the need to politicize, or institutionalize, affected interests. This would lead to a shared decision-making authority.