Urban Migration Policy and Social Movement Outcomes: Protest as a Source of Institutional Legitimacy. Evidence from the Cities of Milan and Barcelona

As the so-called ‘migration crisis’ unfolded, the contentious politics of migration-related issues has dramatically escalated. While being global in nature, such crucial juncture has produced deep consequences also at the local level, as in the case of national borders and urban contexts situated along migration routes. This paper investigates the policy outcomes of solidarity movements by focusing on the cities of Milan and Barcelona. It argues that urban political actors are incentivized to form alliances – even ‘unexpected’ ones – when look-ing for policy solutions concerning immigration and the city. During the last seven years, and especially since 2014, tens of thousands of migrants have reached Milan. This implied the emergence and partial resolution of multiple policy problems, such as the first aid of asylum-seekers, as well as their social integration. Differently, the migration influxes towards Barcelona have been much smaller. The local government asked the central one to augment the number of asylum-seekers to be hosted by the city. These two urban contexts are then facing different social problems. Yet, similarities exist as local movements are obtaining partial victories, both in procedural and substantive terms. Why do actors that usually engage in adversarial interactions are instead cooperating? Why are urban movements having success, i.e. why are local public officials responsive vis-à-vis their demands? By intersecting social movement, migration, and policy studies, a comparative case study is carried out to solve this puzzle. Two conditions are necessary to explain such outcomes. First, the ‘municipal opportunity structure’, i.e. the configuration of power in the local government, shall be favorable for urban actors. Cooperation between movement activists and local public officials is possible only when they are ideologically proximate. Second, the multilevel governance of migration is also crucial, as it incentivizes urban actors – both inside and outside institutions – to jointly pressure the central government. The mechanism unfold as follows. Protesters tend to target local politicians that are sympathetic with their demands. In turn, these politicians can use outsiders’ protest as a source of legitimacy to negotiate support and financing with the central government. In short, the responsiveness of policy-makers vis-à-vis movement claims depends on their reciprocal need in tackling urban affairs. Findings are based on the analysis of policy documents, newspapers, and semi-structured interviews with pol-icy-makers, movement representatives, and other key informants. This paper contributes to the extant literature on social movement outcomes and local government in Southern Europe by placing urban politics at the center of explanation.