'Multilateralism' Russian Style – Russia’s Engagement in the Syrian Crisis

In the majority of Western mass media and academic publications, Russia has been portrayed as a lonesome “bad guy”, increasingly acting unilaterally instead of pursuing cooperation with Western actors. If earlier, Russia used multilateral international governmental frameworks to show its dissatisfaction with and to protest against those international developments, which it saw as unfavorable, today, as Russia’s annexation of Crimea or its Syrian campaign have demonstrated, Russia is prepared to act (largely) unilaterally. Nonetheless, focusing on Russia’s engagement in the Syrian conflict, this paper shows that Russia is still pursuing multilateralism in international relations. The paper analyzes Russia’s different types of engagement in the Syrian conflict – from multilateralist attempts, via “minilateralism” and bilateralism, to unilateralism. Thus, its role in the Syrian conflict has been more complex than most publications on the topic acknowledge. Besides acting as a spoiler vis-à-vis the West, Russia has also made attempts to cooperate with Western actors. Furthermore, Russia has been cooperating or coordinating its policies with non-Western actors. It has also used various available multilateral frameworks to pursue its goals. This raises a number of questions about the Russian style of “multilateralism”, which the paper aims to analyze. In the Western sense, multilateralism is something positive, equal to cooperation and associated with peace, but what does it mean for Russia and how does it exercise its “multilateralism” in practice? Is Russian “multilateralism” in the Syrian conflict anti-Western? Even though this seems to be so, nonetheless, some of Russia’s non-Western partners (such as Israel and Turkey) are also Western partners. If Russia does not cooperate with Western states, but cooperates with non-Western countries, does this mean that its policy is not multilateral? According to the theoretical literature, for multilateralism to be effective, it has to be long-term-oriented and normative, with partners sharing common values and principles. Can Russia’s “multilateralism” be effective nonetheless, without having these basics? To find answers to these questions, Russian policy will be examined through the prism of broader “multilateralism” studies and neoclassical realism. This paper shows that even if Russia acts against the interests of Western actors, it is, nonetheless, able to act multilaterally with non-Western actors. This is not the normative type of multilateralism that Western actors have been aiming for (at least in theory, if not always in practice), but rather an instrumental ad hoc tactical multilateralism. It is not based on strong shared values or ideology (though some commonality of views and positions on international affairs is a given). There is neither trust nor psychological closeness of the leaders. This type of multilateralism will not last long, but it is, nonetheless, effective in the short run and brings the allies desired victories and benefits. When designing policy towards Russia, Western leaders need to understand this specific type of Russian multilateralism. While there are many publications on “multilateralism” in general and the “multilateralism” of the EU, USA and even China, Russia’s “multilateralism” remains under-researched. This paper aims to make a contribution to the debates around Russian “multilateralism.”