Changes in German Climate and Energy Policy Governance During the Energy Transition (Energiewende)

Many previous researches on Germany’s climate and energy policy during the Merkel III government failed to sufficiently explain the policy changes, because they lacked aspects of governance and party systems in their analyses. Moreover, they did not clarify the changes in the governance between the Merkel II and III governments. Nor did they analyze the coordination processes among actors, especially with the strongest veto-player, the federal states (Länder). Based on such limitations, first, this presentation elucidates the climate and energy policy processes from the perspective of consensus-oriented/negotiation democracy governance since the Merkel II government and clarifies its changes based on process-tracing. Discourse analysis is also performed. Second, this presentation explains the reasons for these changes. Germany’s climate and energy policy and its governance changed because of the changes in its party system to a ‘fluid five party system’ and its society’s ideas that resulted from the reciprocal effects of ‘critical juncture’ and ‘policy entrepreneurs’. In its nuclear policy, the Merkel II government sought consensuses and compromises with limited actors and prioritized state governments over electricity firms or labour unions. Chancellor Merkel pursued a top-down style to abolish nuclear generation after consultation with policymakers. The Merkel III government changed its governance by seeking more inclusivity and transparency in policymaking. It sought a consensus with federal states, large electricity companies, and citizens because an ideal structure of participatory democracy and transparency in policymaking began to be established in late 2010. In nuclear generation, two myths collapsed: The first ‘critical juncture’ occurred after the 2011 Japanese Fukushima disaster, which shattered the myth that NPPs are safe and operable. In the BW state election in 2011, the myth collapsed that BW is a CDU and FDP stronghold. Additionally, a second ‘critical juncture’ occurred where the Greens greatly increased their strength, matching that of the SPD. CDU promoted its modernization. Led by Merkel and Röttgen as ‘policy entrepreneurs’, a ‘window of opportunity’ was opened and a new ideal structure emerged for abolishing nuclear generation and promoting renewable energy. Another ‘critical juncture’ was created when Stuttgart 21 became an important issue and the Greens and Pirates increased their power through the party system’s fragmentation. ‘Policy entrepreneurs’ were compelled to reflect as much participatory democracy and transparency as possible to appease unsatisfied citizens. In coal generation, the UNFCCC-COPs and G7 functioned as another ‘critical juncture’. Merkel et al. would lose international honour if Germany failed to satisfy its own promises about climate maintenance. Hendricks assumed a decisive role as a ‘policy entrepreneur’. Gabriel and Merkel later became ‘policy entrepreneurs’. A subsystem structure emerged among a) a ‘fraction climate maintenance’ vs. a fraction coalition and between b) ‘economic development’ and c) ‘status quo’ based on fear of industrial transformation, such as electricity shortages and unemployment. Under a ‘fluid-five party system’, large parties converged at the center, created a Grand-Coalition, and made policy changes. As such, a new ideal structure began to take shape to abolish coal generation.