How to Classify and Measure Presidential Powers? Experience from Central Europe

Political science scholarship offers a variety of different classifications and measurements of presidential powers (e.g. Frye, 1997; Metcalf, 2000; Shugart and Carey, 1992). Despite many of these measurements being plagued by insufficient validity and reliability (Doyle and Elgie, 2016), they are generally accepted and widely used in various comparative studies. In this paper we offer our own classification and measurement of presidential powers tailored to presidents in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia. As political practice in these countries shows, real powers rarely correspond to the formal-constitutional position of the presidents. Traditional classifications and methods of measuring presidential powers are intended to quantify formal powers but these do not tell much about how these powers are exercised in practice. Taking this observation as a point of departure, we propose adapting existing classifications and methods so that they into account circumstances that decrease or increase the presidential powers. Our approach builds on two intersecting criteria, the first being our original contribution: 1) degree of presidents' independence in using their powers, and 2) area to which presidents' competencies relate. The first criterion gives us three groups of powers: a) independent, b) contingent, and c) shared, whereas the second criterion traditionally yields two groups of powers: a) legislative, and b) non-legislative. With respect to the structure of our paper, we first introduce our classification and method of measuring presidential powers. We then provide an overview of presidential powers in Central Europe in line with this measurement. These powers are then subject to measurement of the overall presidential powers. Our results show that the Polish President enjoys the largest score, the Czech President follows him, and the Slovak President scores the lowest value of presidential powers. Yet, the differences among the Central European presidents in terms of their formal powers are rather small and they do not wield executive power, which would predetermine them to govern.