Objections Against Political Compromises: An Attempt at a Typology

This contribution is an attempt at a typology of moral and political objections against political compromises. I intend to consider six main arguments directed against compromise: integrity, anti-relativism, equality, plurality, irreducibility of conflicts and political unity. The first argument considered in this typology is the claim for integrity, which is used to diminish the moral and political value of all or certain compromises. As mentioned by Carrie Menkel-Meadow we “should not compromise one’s principles, those things we believe in, because it is those moral and political beliefs that are constitutive of who ‘we’ (nation, organization, group, team, or person) are — how we define ourselves and our ‘reasoned integrity’” (2016: 3). In Law’s Empire, Dworkin uses the notion of integrity to disqualify internal compromises, notably the “checkerboard laws” that treat similar situations on arbitrary grounds (1986:179). The second claim against compromise is linked to an anti-relativist perspective. Compromise can be contested due to the fact that it is achieved at the expense of moral or political principles that are considered to be good and that this “good” is considered as “knowable, objective, rational, and essentially, at its core, universal” (Menkel-Meadow 2016: 3). The relationship between the notion of compromise and the relativistic perspective was exposed by John Morley in his epigraph at the beginning of his book, On Compromise, when he affirms that, “It makes all the difference in the world whether we put Truth in the first place or in the second place,” (1874). The third objection concerns the inequalities that compromise could amplify, knowing that the result or the output of compromise is dependent on the specificities or the attributes of the compromisers, which are not equal. (Ruser and Machin 2017) If the power and resources in their various forms are not equal, the legitimacy of compromise can be put in question (Bellamy and Hollis 2010: 13). The fourth objection can be formulated as follows: compromise could reduce the wealth and diversity of the political debate by excluding the political voices that don’t want to compromise, and those who are involved in compromises are “in danger of ‘watering down’ their positions.” (Ruser and Machin 2017). The fifth category of arguments against compromise is related to a specific understanding of politics which underlines the irreducibility of (class) conflicts. Chantal Mouffe (1999: 755) is certainly an eloquent illustration of this. Her conception of politics necessarily includes an irreducible conflictual dimension, which is not compatible with an understanding of democracy oriented towards the quest for compromises. Finally, the sixth objection against compromise is expressed notably by Schmitt, who considers that compromises (above all committed by political parties) are deleterious for the unity of the State because they acknowledge the fragmentation of the political body and the political competition. Schmitt’s constant criticisms are often combined with two other objects of criticism: parliamentary regimes and political parties (Schmitt 2008: 131-172).