Agonistic Compromise

This paper addresses the relationship between agonistic democracy and compromise. It argues, contra critical voices of agonists (Mouffe 2000, 2013; Machin/Ruser 2017), that an agonistic understanding of democracy, which emphasises the need for political conflict and the visibility of differences among opposing political projects, is not in conflict with compromise. To the contrary, agonists have good reason to include compromise into their political frameworks. However, while a consideration of the potentially positive relationship between agonism and compromise encourages an account of agonistic politics that incorporates a plurality of political practices, it also contributes to the present debate on compromise. An agonistic reading of compromise suggests that theorists of compromise should sharpen their understanding of the conflictual nature of compromise as well as of the conditions under which compromise may have detrimental political effects. The paper consists of three parts. In the first part, I present the main characteristics of agonistic democracy, which I understand as a worthwhile alternative to established models of deliberative democracy, and set out why agonists are critical of compromise: compromise is seen to disguise political divisions, discourage political passions, and undermine a vibrant pluralistic politics. In the second part, I challenge this negative perception of compromise and defend the notion of an agonistic compromise. I show that compromise does not necessarily have the effects that agonists fear and demonstrate that under certain conditions compromise actually helps to foster the political objectives of agonistic democracy. In the third part, I refer to the present debate on compromise and point out how the agonistic stance provides impulses to this debate. First, while theorists of compromise have for the most part focused on the nature of compromise and on reasons for compromise, the agonistic stance urges them to investigate political practices of compromise. How can parties who disagree deeply and understand themselves as opponents cooperate as compromisers? Second, the agonistic stance suggests that the role of compromise in politics should not be exaggerated. Democratic reasons to compromise, also the distinctively agonistic ones, are convincing in the light of certain political conditions. If other conditions prevail, political competition and the rejection of concessions on the part of political opponents may be preferable for the benefit of a pluralistic democracy.