The Regulatory Role of Digital Platforms in Urban Government. The Case of Waze.

In the last few years, new actors have entered into the urban government: the digital platforms. These actors own two main characteristics which differentiate them from the traditional private actors that are involved into urban policies. They deploy a service without having a territorial presence and without contracting with municipalities. The success of these digital intermediaries has raised some important issues to urban authorities in various sectors such as transportation (Uber) or housing (Airbnb). Indeed, these specific features make ineffective the traditional regulatory instruments of public-private relationships. In this communication, I want to explore the relationship between urban authorities and digital platforms to analyze how the latter question traditional regulatory instruments and what strategies the former set up to answer it. Based on ethnographic work into local transportation authorities, this communication will focus on the case of Waze. Waze is an Israeli company founded in 2008 which offers a GPS-based navigation application program. Its originality is to be based on map data and traffic information providing in real-time by its users. Massively used in France, Waze application raises several important issues for local transportation authorities as it represents an alternative way to regulate the public road network. From real-time users’ data, Waze’s algorithms suggest itineraries which are not based on the road hierarchy defined by local transportation authorities. The faster itinerary is always preferred regardless the size of the road. As a consequence, flows of cars circulate through secondary ways. Individually, it is not really a matter of fact, but, the addition of vehicles is problematic for several reasons: environmental nuisances (pollution, noise, etc.) for the inhabitants, public safety and infrastructural impacts (the secondary road surface is not conceived to absorb so much traffic). More broadly, there is an important opposition between Waze services and local transportation policies. Indeed, the aim of Waze is to satisfy the individual interest of the automobilist which is to reach destination as fast as possible. On the contrary, local authorities pursue a general interest of a modal shift from car to bike or public transportation. For local public servants, these two interests are contradictory as more traffic fluidity risks to encourage some people to re-use their car. Traditional tools of government are ineffective to solve this opposition between these two ways of regulating road network. Indeed, Waze act independently of local authorities. It does not use public data, nor contracts with authorities and does not have any territorial presence. Local transportation authorities must establish new ways of regulation to deal with these issues. Firstly, they play with Waze algorithms by modifying the road infrastructure (speed bump, traffic light, etc.) and so reducing car speed. Secondly, they participate into Waze data exchange program in order to establish a partnership between local authorities and the company. Thirdly, they develop programs of communication to influence local users. The case of Waze illustrates the reconfiguration of power into urban governance due to the emergence of global digital platforms, whom power relies on the control of information flows.