Political Fragmentation and Parliamentary Activeness in Presidential Authoritarian Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Executive-Legislative Relations in Post-Soviet Eurasia

Abstract The paper investigates how the structure of the relation between government and parliament affects the role of parliament in authoritarian presidential systems. Scholars argue that parliaments are channels through which leaders co-opt potential regime defectors by giving legislative influence. This paper argues that parliaments only fulfil such a role when the threat of regime breakdown as a consequence of parliamentary defections is plausible. Using a framework that highlights divisions within the government’s parliamentary support and the strength of opposition, the analysis focusses on legislative activeness in four authoritarian parliaments in former-Soviet countries (Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan). Legislative activeness is understood in terms of quantity (number of enacted parliamentary bills; average degree of parliamentary text change of government bills) and scope (size of groups immediately affected by the legislation; size of impact; externalities for those not primarily affected). It is expected that parliaments are only arenas for policy concessions when the political elite is divided and, therefore, more likely to disintegrate below the minimum level of support for the government. Original data show that parliaments in systems with internal disputes and/or external challenges are relatively active. Governments offer legislative influence to avoid defections and, consequently, regime breakdown. Parliaments in countries with a monolithic structure are relatively inactive. Interestingly, although parliaments in fragmented systems are more active in quantitative terms, intra-coalitional dispute impedes them from enacting legislation with far-reaching implications. Parliamentary legislation in monolithic systems is low in quantity, but low levels of intra-coalitional dispute render a larger policy scope feasible.