The Globalization-State Authority Relationship: the Case of Russia

Globalization is a contested phenomenon, which, among other things, involves changes in the significance of state authority. However, specific implications of globalization for the state have been largely disputed for more than two decades. Presently there is no end of this debate in sight, and, as D. Rodrik (1997) suggested, there are valid reasons to be concerned about the quality of it. Essentially, most arguments about globalization can be lumped into three camps. The representatives of the first camp argue that globalization has been undermining state’s power (Strange, 1997, Strange, 1990, Held et al., 1999, Wall, 2012, etc.) in a number of ways. The second camp asserts that globalization does not lead to the state authority decline, arguing that there is a number of variables from the limitations of international trade to the extent of capital mobility that underscore the potential of globalization. (Rodrik, 1997, Rosenboim, 2017). The third camp’s argument is somewhat similar to the one of the second camp. It revolves around the premise that globalization does not lead to the “end of politics” for one specific reason – globalization is nothing new. For them, the present international economy is not historically unique, and the scope of transnational corporations and capital flows is limited. This research argues that while the first camp has valid points about the influence of globalization on the state power, and it does change the relationship between states, markets, and individuals, the idea that globalization leads to the erosion of the state authority and makes the notion of the state no more relevant is highly problematic. It tests the “decline of the state” argument against the case of Russia. To do that, this piece is going to focus on three spheres globalization has eroded state authority in as outlined by Strange (1997) – defense, finance, and the provision of welfare. The case of Russia seems relevant as an illustration of the larger argument stated above for a few reasons. First, over the last 15 years Russian leadership has been augmenting its state authority and centralizing political power which seems to contravene the first “globalization camp”. Second, there has been a dilemma driving Russian political establishment -- a centralized state and monopolization of economic institutions on the one hand, and achieving an open, prosperous economy on the other. From this point of view, it would be interesting to see whether and how Russia could maintain state authority and domestic control while striving for economic prosperity through globalization. Finally, the Russian case seems fitting because the proponents of the first camp assert that armies still exist mostly because they need to preserve domestic order and not to repel invaders. According to them, national defense is now anachronistic; however, Russia’s military interventions in Georgia, Syria, Ukraine and the recent involvement in the US presidential elections are good reasons to rethink how we understand the notion of national defense and whether it actually is obsolete.