Normative Democratic Theory as a Tool for Practical Reasoning

This paper seeks to clarify the “proper” status and function of normative democratic theory in democratic practice. It suggests that normative democratic theory should function as a “tool” for practical reasoning, one that assists democracy’s participants in carrying out two principal tasks: clarifying what their own democratic norms and values are; and conducting empirical inquiries that illuminate how, in some particular context, they might best uphold those norms and realize those values. To develop these ideas, Part I discusses John Dewey’s “empirical-instrumentalist” conception of moral theory, juxtaposing it with two more familiar ones. “Generalism” aims to develop moral principles that are universal in scope and that “tell us” how we are to act in cases of a particular kind. “Particularism,” by contrast, rejects the need for moral theory altogether or, at a minimum, holds that, in moral deliberation, there need be no attempt to bring moral principles to bear on particular situations. Normative democratic theory is a kind of moral theory, and a Deweyan approach to it is, I suggest, more appropriate than either a generalist or a particularist one. Dewey recognizes the need for principles that are broad in scope. He also recognizes, however, that sound moral judgment responds to the exigencies of a particular context and so is non-codifiable. Hence, a Deweyan approach to normative democratic theory balances a kind of generalism with a kind of particularism. Part II illustrates how normative democratic theory, construed in this way, can assist democracy’s participants with the two tasks mentioned above.