Did the Euro Crisis Lead to a Centralisation of Member States’ EU Policy Co-Ordination? The Unlikely Case of Germany

How do EU member state governments react institutionally to crises of core state power integration (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs 2016)? The Euro crisis between 2010 and 2015 is a case in point. It linked national leaders’ electoral fortunes to EU policy, required rapid and effective national decision-making and thus increased the pressures for centralising national EU policy co-ordination. Against this background, our paper analyses whether the EU crisis indeed led to such centralisation in the unlikely case of Germany. Before the crisis, Germany proved an exception to the rule that European integration empowers the coordination offices of head of states or governments. In EU policy co-ordination, the principle of ministers’ personal ‘portfolio responsibility’ (Ressortprinzip) prevailed over the chancellor’s responsibility for ‘general guidelines of policy’ (Kanzlerprinzip). As a consequence, EU policy was co-ordinated without hierarchisation between federal ministries and the chancellery. In reaction to the Euro crisis, German EU co-ordination has become somewhat more hierarchically structured, with the chancellery assuming increasing responsibilities in arbitrating conflicts between different ministries. Our study investigates Germany as a least-likely case for such institutional change in EU policy co-ordination: The rigid institutional triangle comprising the ministries of foreign affairs and the economy (during the crisis led by the junior coalition party) and finance (conservative-led) should inhibit the chancellery’s initiatives to impose its leadership on ministerial co-ordination. The purpose of our study is to identify the conditions under which (coalition) governments decide to relax the non-hierarchical nature of horizontal co-ordination to achieve more rapid and effective decision-making. Our conclusions build on empirical data gathered in expert interviews with federal officials from various ministries and the chancellery. Genschel, P. and Jachtenfuchs, M. (2016) ‘More Integration, Less Federation: The European Integration of Core State Powers’, Journal of European Public Policy 23(1): 42–59.