A suite of terms and concepts have emerged over the past twenty years as researchers and practitioners have striven to better understand a form of collaboration known as “Whole-of-Government” (WoG). While WoG can be used to describe collaboration between any number of government departments, the word has been adopted by international security and development actors as an approach to navigating the complex issues associated with state fragility. Departmental priorities, organizational cultures, accountability frameworks, access to resources and shifting political interests are just a subset of the barriers involved with such an undertaking. In the decade after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, the Government of Canada advanced the concept of WoG as an important feature of the country’s international engagement in areas of conflict, fragility and instability worldwide. The leading example of Canada’s experimentation with WoG was the development, implementation and evolution of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) and its funding mechanism the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF). The case study examined through this research seeks to deepen our understanding of the WoG phenomenon by exploring the experiences and insights of practitioners, policy makers and military professionals who participated in international stabilization and humanitarian assistance campaigns between 2002 and 2012.
A thematic coding analysis of interview data revealed six key insights about the operationalization of WoG initiatives. First, a high-level, public enthusiasm for WoG is not always an indication that sufficient institutional commitment exists for an effective implementation of a WoG initiative. Second, despite the cross-cutting nature of issues related to stabilization and humanitarian assistance, a perfect storm of issues present in Canada at the time resulted in ministerial accountability and departmental authority becoming more pronounced during this time. Third, there is a complex and problematic interplay between structure, culture and human resources. If the structures were not so rigid, the cultures not so well established, the sense of difference not quite so profound and the human resource systems more agile, cross-boundary collaboration might occur more organically. Fourth, WoG leaders and team members must appreciate the role of perspective and what conditions cause practitioners to be somewhat blind to perspectives that are different from their own. Fifth, organizational boundaries cannot be easily ignored or destroyed. Instead, they must be aptly navigated and managed. Successful WoG is, therefore, strongly dependent on the skills, aptitudes and personality traits of the individuals involved. Finally, joint training and education might foster the development a cross-departmental WoG professional cadre; a contingent of talented and versatile individuals equipped with skills necessary for cross-boundary collaboration but also the specialized abilities that would allow them to thrive in complex post-conflict or humanitarian emergencies.
This research offers a timely contribution to the study and practice of WoG. The imperative for greater and more effective collaboration amongst government departments in the face of complex and cross-cutting issues persists today. As such this paper concludes with a discussion of how study insights might be translated to the Canadian government’s present-day efforts to promote peace, security and stability.
