The Functions and Dysfunctions of Political Violence: Disaggregating the Campaign of the Provisional IRA

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was a clandestine organisation which was active for the best part of thirty years. The nature of the violence perpetrated by the organisation has been debated by many scholars to date. Whether the organisation can be said to have been civilian centric, sectarian, or ‘terrorist’, for example, has been divisive. The study of political violence more generally, is a burgeoning field of research. Shifting away from thesis of barbarity and irrationality, political violence is increasingly framed in the literature as exhibiting explainable functions. The notion that there is a logical strategy to the perpetration of acts of terrorism is discussed, for example, by Peter Neumann and Michael Rainsborough. And, an ethical framework of guerrilla warfare has even been attested by Michael Gross. By contrast, the dysfunctions of politically violent organisations and their actions have seen relatively little attention. Politically violent groups take to arms in a manner than is both clandestine and amateur. Weapons are improvised or rudimentary rendering their chances of accurately fulfilling their intentions slim. Homemade bombs are temperamental and can have somewhat unpredictable detonation times. Unpremeditated civilian’s casualties can be incurred when bombs explode prematurely or are planted in locations other than what was the prescribed, as the apparent imminent detonation of a device caused the planter to deviate from the plan in panic. The imperfect line of communication between bomb planter and the security services whom they are calling to action is insufficient. Bomb warnings may not be taken seriously. The action required to clear civilians from a scene may be beyond the capabilities of the security forces in the time frame provided. Or the Clandestine group may fail to update the security forces when the specifics of their plans change under pressure. Shooting attacks claim unintended casualties as bullets go astray or targets are misidentified. Members can be relatively untrained. And, their often-illegal status means that politically violent organisations are reliant on social devices rather than law to ensure conformity and adherence to policy within their own ranks. As such, groups like the PIRA are prone to tactical errors in the execution of their attacks, experience dissention, and can fall prey to deviations from organisational policy or goals as individual agenda creeps into their activities. The disparity between what an organisation like the PIRA intended to achieve with its campaign of violence, and the actual outcome of its attacks can be vast. And it is by recognising this somewhat hitherto ignored disparity that scholars will better understand the nature of politically violent organisations such as the PIRA in terms of group and individual intentions, operational lethality, actual capacity for precision, and the limitations or external factors which shape their violent campaigns. This paper will discuss what can be learnt about the nature of the PIRA and the forces shaping its activity when we look beyond the actual human cost of the violence they perpetrated.