Politics Without Principals? National Trade Administrations and EU Trade Policy

One of the oldest discussions in scholarship on the European Union concerns the intergovernmental or supranational nature of the policy-making system. While the member states have delegated authority to the European Commission, the former still retain control through their role within the Council of Ministers. The ensuing power struggle between the Commission and the Member States for autonomy and control has led to a burgeoning literature applying principal-agent theory. Most studies in this regard inquire into the effectiveness of available control mechanisms as a precursor of agency. Instead of looking at control mechanisms, this paper suggests a stronger focus towards the capabilities of the administrations in the member states is warranted. If the member states cannot assess the impact or consequences of European legislation, it is not realistic to expect such principals to control the agent accordingly, regardless of the availability of stringent control mechanisms in place. The relation between the domestic administration on the one hand and control and influence within the Council on the other hand has thus far received little attention. The goal of this paper is to bridge that gap by analysing how different characteristics of the domestic trade administration (centralization, coordination, representation, size ) affect member states' ability to exert control over the European Commission. Hypotheses are derived from a qualitative pilot study in three countries and are tested for the 27 Member States through a survey conducted with participants of the responsible council working parties.