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Beyond Learning and Accountability: Comparing the Political Use of Evaluation in International Organisations

Governance
International Relations
Public Administration
Influence
Steffen Eckhard
Zeppelin University Friedrichshafen
Steffen Eckhard
Zeppelin University Friedrichshafen
Vytas Jankauskas
Zeppelin University Friedrichshafen

Abstract

Over the past two decades, the vast majority of international organizations (IOs) have increasingly institutionalized evaluation as an integral part of their organizational practices. As provided by the IO rules and guidelines, evaluation is thought to be a scientific process of analysis for learning and accountability. Yet, this paper argues that beyond its formal mandate, evaluation emerges as a political tool in organizational stakeholders’ struggle for interests and power. Building on a rationalist-power perspective, we hypothesize that the political use of evaluation in IOs depends on who—member states or international public administrations (IPA)—control structural resources of evaluation systems (budget and agenda setting). We scrutinize this hypothesis empirically by applying a most similar system design to compare six UN system IOs which differ depending on who—member states, the IPA, or both—controls evaluation structure. Based on primary documents, expert interviews and content analysis, we reveal the political evaluation use to follow one predominant pattern: Depending on member states or administrative control of resources (or a mix), evaluation units orientate towards either of these actors (or both) and evaluations are accordingly used in line with typical member states or bureaucratic interests (collective principal and agent control dynamics vs. collective agent and bureaucratic influence dynamics). Findings underline that current push towards objective evaluations that inform evidence-based policy making should not be taken for granted, but rather seen in the context of contested interests, especially in such complex organizational environments like IOs. Findings also speak to the rational design theory, which postulates that those who control institutional designs wield further influence over processes and outcomes. Finally, the paper unmasks evaluation as a so far overseen tool in IOs’ power dynamics, thus contributing to IO studies which seek to understand the relationship between member states and IO bureaucracies.