Independence and Accountability: Mission Impossible for the European Central Bank?

During the euro area crisis, the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) as a political actor raised concerns about its independence, accountability and legitimacy. Against this background, this paper investigates whether the ECB reacted to these accountability concerns during and following the sovereign debt crisis. We revisit the independence-accountability nexus, adding three qualifications to the conventional wisdom that independence and accountability do not go together. First, we argue that a fiduciary relation characterized by a high level of independence with weakly developed accountability components represents a significant challenge for the ECB’s role as a political actor. Second, when several of the accountability dimensions are weakly developed, the formal bases of ECB authority are more likely to be questioned. Third, when supranational institutions isolate themselves and resist attempts to render them accountable to the outside world, they suffer from a multiple accountability disorder that is more likely to undermine their authority in the long term. The findings contribute to the literature on accountability and the causes and consequences of delegating power to supranational organizations.