Towards Fiscalisation of the Eurozone? National Preferences on the Fiscal Union and Implications for Accountability

A number of scholars (e.g. Fabbrini 2016; Ziblatt 2014) have thoroughly analyzed the recent developments in the economic governance of the EU, which was a result of the Euro crisis, and some of them also identified the dangers of the chosen model of fiscal oversight at the EU level (e.g. Hinarejos 2013: 1638-1641). The previous research has focused on either particular legal instruments, like the golden rule (Fabbrini 2013), the legal aspects of the new treaties (de Witte 2013), the overall constitutional implications of the new EU economic governance (Tuori and Tuori 2014), or the actions of particular institutions, like the European Central Bank (ECB) (Schelkle 2012) or the European Commission (Bauer, Becker and Kern 2013). However, there is little research which would comprehensively demonstrate the preferences of the member states regarding federal fiscal union – or fiscalization, as I call it (Wozniakowski 2018) - and qualitatively analyse the main arguments of the member states (but see Wasserfallen and Lehner 2017). The Euro crisis demonstrated the flaws of the institutional structure of the EU and consequently triggered a debate on how to address them. The EU institutions took the lead in this effort and the so-called Five Presidents’ Report titled ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’ is the example thereof. It is a crucial source because there is an access to the contributions submitted by the member states, in which they answered a number of questions regarding their preferences on a number of topics, including fiscalization. By analysing the national preferences on the fiscalization of the Eurozone expressed in this debate, which will be updated using secondary sources, this paper intends to help fill this gap.