Unconstrained Partisans: Finding The Pathways to Intra-Party Deliberation

Political parties as non-unitary entities routinely face difficult choices over policy issues and day-to-day strategy. Internal decision-making over these choices at times happens in collective bodies and is preceded by communication among their individual members. Even more so, partisan decision-makers are said to be willing to deliberate at least when not bound by prior policy commitments (Wolkenstein 2018). The question that the present paper asks is under what conditions intra-party deliberation may happen. The question is examined as a collective action problem around referendum initiation faced by a party in government. This decision-making situation leaves more room for deliberation and exposes the party to a greater risk. Referendum is first and foremost a procedure, which necessitates proper consideration of its potential consequences to a decision-maker before she forms her view on it. Additionally, a referendum can be marred by divisiveness and voter ignorance and may be seen as a riskier, more high-stakes policy-making instrument than an internally reached compromise. The study relies on a formal model built to investigate the interaction between the members of an intra-party decision-making body. The optimal conditions, under which the majority of its members form a preference towards holding a referendum on a relevant policy issue or reaching a compromise position on it, are discovered. The emphasis is placed on the interplay between the conflicting incentives to cling to one’s own policy position, to tack to the electoral constituency and to engage in a merit-based discussion with one’s colleagues. The analysis highlights the ways, in which these complex motivations lead to either purely strategic bargaining or deliberation.