Analogical Reasoning and Evolving Informal Rules in International Institutions

The paper examines the role of analogies for the evolution of informal rules in international institutions. Institutional decision processes are, beyond formal decision procedures, also shaped by informal practices and conventions that evolve over time from intra-institutional interaction. Since a rational design perspective has difficulty explaining such informal rules, we draw on constructivist and psychological insights, but adopt a (moderate) rational choice perspective of actors to shed light on generative mechanisms and effects. 1. Drawing on sociological theory, the paper will briefly sketch a conception of evolving institution in which every collective decision modifies the intra-institutional environment within which actors operate. 2. We will develop a generative mechanism that elucidates how even rational actors are gradually enmeshed in an increasingly dense web of collectively adopted decisions and evolving informal rules. (a) Drawing on theories of international practices, the paper argues that communities of practice, e.g. the members of international institutions, produce through their interaction powerful patterns of action that resemble informal rules. However, practice theory lacks generative mechanisms. b) Drawing on rational choice theories, we argue that practices may emerge from interaction among rational actors in coordination situations with multiple equilibria and that adherence to precedents and previous experience may instantiate informal institutions (conventions). However, such conventions tend to remain stable as long as the underlying situations do not significantly change. (c) Drawing on the psychological literature on analogical reasoning, the paper shows that the use of precedents and analogs is itself a complex process. It demonstrates that informal rules based on precedents and analogs are continuously evolving and, within limits, inherently expansive, because situations are never completely identical. 3. The paper will illustrate the logics of evolving informal rules based on analogical reasoning with evidence from the Yugoslavia sanctions committee of the United Nations Security Council.