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A Critical Assessment of How the 'Syrian Crisis' has been Labelled

Asia
Conflict
Ethnic Conflict
Media
Knowledge
War
Peace
Protests
Housamedden Darwish
University of Cologne
Housamedden Darwish
University of Cologne

Abstract

The main aim of this paper is to argue that using different names to describe the “Syrian crisis” (revolution, civil war, proxy war …etc.) has a huge theoretical and ethical implications. There have been generally different approaches to naming the Syrian crisis. The majority of Western media, politicians and scholars have often labeled the Syrian crisis as a civil war or sometimes a proxy war. Others, notably the Syrians, have chosen different names for the crisis: (1) a conspiracy or war on terror by the pro-government people; and (2) a revolution by the opposition. What should we call the Syrian crisis? In answering this question, it is important to clarify the multidimensional and epochal or transformative nature of the crisis in order to argue against both positions that can be considered as reductive and simplified labeling. Moreover, by critically analysing both positions, one can show that labeling or naming is not a neutral act but it also conveys an evaluation. This paper argues that the Syrian crisis is not only a civil war or even a war, but it also has a revolutionary dimension; it is a revolution. Names are, and particularly in this case, norms. Labels such as “revolution” and “civil war” should be used and understood as (quasi-) thick concepts. Given the fact that thick concepts have their epistemic descriptive dimensions, it should also be recognized that the act of labeling also carries normative ethical dimensions. Therefore, by changing names, we change our interpretation as defined by Aristotle as the following: “to say something of something is, in the complete and strong sense of the term, to interpret”.