The Fallibilism of Public Reason

Public reason liberals hold that the exercise of political power is legitimate only if it is justified on the grounds of reasons that all citizens may reasonably be expected to accept. The motivation behind this public justification principle (PJP) is to determine the necessary condition for reasonable pluralism and stability in a society characterized by deep ideological disagreement among citizens. Accordingly, the standard interpretation of PJP requires that in public justification of their preferred legal provisions citizens restrain themselves from using arguments derived directly from comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. All these non-public reasons ought to be replaced or at least supplemented by properly public reasons that draw on, as Rawls has put it, “an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens.” I will defend an alternative, fallibilistic formulation of PJP: The exercise of political power is legitimate only if it is justified on the grounds of reasons that the reason-givers themselves may reasonably be expected to reject. As I will explain, the rejectability requirement targets reasons that draw on final values. Due to the incommensurability of final values, arguments that invoke them are necessarily non-negotiable. These arguments do not admit of reasonable criticism, which makes them inappropriate for democratic deliberation. I will argue that the fallibilistic rejectability requirement provides a better conceptualization of justificatory restraint than the acceptability requirement. To this end I will show, firstly, how the acceptability requirement gives rise to three major objections: a) due to the vagueness of the notion of “reasonable acceptability” the exercise of justificatory restraint is inevitably arbitrary; b) justificatory restraint is not necessary to attain the goals that it is aimed at, such as showing respect for fellow citizens, maintaining civic friendship, and ensuring social stability; c) justificatory restraint places an unfair burden on some citizens’ moral integrity. Secondly, I will show how the rejectability requirement escapes these objections. Finally, I will argue that, despite possible worries, the fallibilistic PJP is not self-defeating and it does not undermine the constitutional essentials of liberal democracy.