Customisation and Problem-Solving in the European Union

The differentiated implementation of European Union (EU) policies by member states is often seen as a serious threat to European Unity, watering down the very objectives of EU Directives. The better regulation policy of the E fights unnecessary regulation and aims for quality of regulation across the life-cycle of EU policymaking. Within this agenda, the criticisms of gold-plating seek to prevent member states from engaging in unnecessary “over-implementation” of EU policies. However, the empirical evidence is surprisingly weak. This article summarizes recent work proposing an improved measure of “customization” that captures how EU rules change when being implemented. After clarifying the relationship between gold-plating and customization, I present the existing evidence about the prevalence and effects of customization. An appropriate understanding of the consequences of customization must distinguish between the quantity and the quality of customization, that is, customized density and customized restrictiveness. I illustrate this distinction and its relationship with practical implementation success based on EU food safety policies in five Western European countries. The existing evidence unambiguously suggests that certain forms of customized restrictiveness improve the practical implementation of EU policies, thus enhancing the EU’s problem-solving capacity. The conclusions draw concrete policy recommendations to inform the better regulation agenda and the study of differentiation in EU multilevel governance more generally.