Elite Preferences in the Process of Regime Type Choice: The Case of Ukraine

As the third wave of democratization increased the proportion of democracies worldwide, studies of the democratization process and of the new democratic regimes grew. Through these studies, scholars came to appreciate that the choice of regime type; presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential, influences the performance and stability of democracy. If influential, why is a certain regime type chosen? A few studies have targeted the reasons for regime type choices. Studies have mainly treated the choices as taking place within the openness and uncertainty of a critical juncture. In such circumstances, elite actors are expected to prefer and promote the regime type that furthers their own future position of power. Regime type choices have thus mainly been treated as outcomes of rational actors situated in a domestic arena, often studied without giving much attention to potential effects of a particular phase of the process. Studies of independence have, however, illuminated that recent independence puts the survival of the new state at the top of elite actor preferences and studies of democratic diffusion that elite actors also seek to emulate choices made in countries within the international networks. This study tests the applicability of all three theoretical perspectives on the case of Ukraine. Specifically, it focuses the decision-making process of the 1996-year constitution. The study also puts attention to the way the theoretical applicability may differ in between different phases of the process. We find that all three perspectives are valuable to understand the preferences and actions of the elite actors, but also that the applicability of the respective theory depends on the phase of the process.