Swimming Against the Tide? The Juncker Commission and the Revision of the Posting of Workers Directive

The posting of workers is one of the most debated issues at the EU level, and especially so after the Eastern enlargement. The debate has mainly focused on the political conflict between old ‘High-welfare’ and new ‘Low-welfare’ Member States’. On the one hand, old Member States argue in favor the protection of their domestic market from unfair competition and social dumping, and in defense of the autonomy in organizing national labor and welfare systems. On the other hand, new Member States stress the freedom to access foreign market for their service provider and argue in favor the social protection of their posted workers. Following the wide-spread debate on the Viking and Laval cases, in March 2012, the Barroso II Commission adopted its proposal for the so-called Monti II regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. The proposal was met with a negative reaction by the social partners (both the ETUC and Business Europe) and was rejected by a mixed coalition of both old and new Member States. Four years later, in March 2016, the Juncker’s Commission proposed a revision of the posting of workers directive, with the aim to guarantee for every worker in the EU the same pay for the same work in the same place. Consequently, two coalitions emerged. On the one hand, western Member States, a center-left majority of parliamentary groups (mostly form S&D, Green, GUE/NGL) and trade unions. On the other hand, the second coalition was composed by eastern Member State, eurosceptic groups in the European Parliament and business group of interests. After two years of negotations, in June 2018, the proposal for a revision of the posting of workers was approved. Against this background, the aim of this paper is to explore and compare the political conditions that led to the failure of the Monti II and the adoption of Juncker’s proposal. The main argument is that the coexistence of multiple political tensions over posting of workers may have hampered the initial revision of the directive, but also led to the emergence of new political coalitions and windows of opportunities. By tracing the positioning of all the key actors within European Parliament, European Commission, Council and social partners (ETUC and BusinessEurope) involved in both the initiatives, we argue that the Juncker Commission, acting as a policy entrepreneur, was the trigger, able to overcome political conflicts and create the space for policy change.