Committee Assignments in the Parliament of Finland: A Case for a Contingent Distributive Theory?

In the context of the Finnish parliament, this paper addresses the question of what are parties’ strategies when the time of proceeding to assignments to committees has come. It contributes to a rich literature by exploring a new case and introducing a new set of arguments in the explicative model. We argue that committee assignments are strategic tools parties use not only to reach their policy goals but also to save votes at the next election. This paper makes a case for a contingent distributive theory of committee assignments. Three main theories explain committee assignments. The distributive theory states that MPs act to secure policy concessions in favor of their constituents. The information specialization theory argues that the committee system is a way to enhance the efficiency of the parliament by dividing the labor among MPs. Every MP specializes in a few policy domains and seats in the dedicated committee. The partisan theory implies that party groups aim to control the chamber by minimizing the influence of their opponents and prevent individual actions from their members. The current research gives credit to the three theories. Parties play an important role in European legislatures, but empirical studies show that they do not use this power to take control of the committee system. They take into account individual MPs’ preferences and expertise. However, literature does not give robust explanations on why and under what conditions parties take into considerations MPs personal preferences and competencies that may conflict with parties own policy goals. One case study – the Italian Chamber of Deputies – provides first explanations. Authors conclude that the ideological proximity safeguards parties against potential risks on conflicts with their members. This study provides robust results on how parties deal with MPs individual interests. However, the conceptualization of party goals is limited since it is necessary to go beyond policy goals. Our paper includes electoral goals in the models and states that committee assignments may also be a strategy parties use to save votes at a next election. We show that when the electoral gain is expected to be high, parties – mainly in the opposition – may jeopardize the pursuit of their policy goals. This paper offers thus a contribution to the literature on committee assignments by showing that under certain conditions, parties incite their members to save policy concession in favor of their constituents. There is a strong link between party results in district and committee assignments. The distributive theory is suitable to explain assignments of MPs elected in a district where party score is below the national average. More than being a reward for loyalty, committee assignments may also – at least in countries with a highly personalized electoral system – a way to secure more votes in an upcoming election. Introducing electoral goals into the model helps to understand the paradoxical high explanative power of the distributive theory in European party-controlled legislatures.