When Organisational Incentives Trump Ideology and Threat: Investigating the Lack of Cooperation among Small Groups in Syria and Palestine

Previous research on rebel group interactions in violent multi-party conflicts predicts that ideologically similar groups will cooperate and form alliances if they are under existential threat and in a relatively weak position vis-à-vis competitors and the main opponent. However, dynamics of interaction within the widely differing cases of Syrian armed opposition and Palestinian Leftist groups contradict this assumption. In Syria, armed opposition groups self-identifying as Free Syrian Army vigorously cooperated in offensive operations against the Syrian regime and ISIS but failed to come together against the threat posed by the increasingly aggressive behavior of their previous ally, Jabhat al-Nusra. Instead, the former Al-Qaeda affiliate took on one faction after the other in an almost unopposed fashion, extinguishing several groups and reducing others to irrelevance. Similarly, Palestinian Leftist groups such as PFLP, DFLP, PPP and Fida cooperated occasionally for specific purposes, but their alliances were always short-lived and never institutionalized. This is puzzling especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when these groups lost one of their main external supporters. During the course of the last three decades, the Palestinian Left lost members, influence and popular support to such a degree that it constitutes an essential crisis for these parties. Forming a stable alliance and eventually joining forces would give the Palestinian Left a stronger voice and enhance their position, especially with regard to the tensions between Fatah and Hamas. In both cases, despite public claims that a closer cooperation would be welcomed, there were no attempts to form stable long-term alliances or even merge groups. Ideologically similar groups in Syria as well as in Palestine displayed only limited attempts at cooperation, notwithstanding their relative weakness and the threat of either military defeat or fading into political irrelevance. They thus constitute an empirical puzzle and a challenge to prevailing theoretical assumptions. By comparing these cases of non-cooperation, which differ widely with regard to numerous aspects, a key relationship could be identified: in certain circumstances, organizational goals, i.e. maintaining the organization, its autonomy and its spheres of influence, being represented as an actor after the end of the conflict, and fighting for pieces of the cake, are stronger than conflict goals that would necessitate deeper cooperation. Based predominantly on interviews with members of armed Syrian opposition and activists from Leftist Palestinian groups and the analysis of primary documents, this paper not only provides valuable insights into both cases but moreover aims at theoretically advancing the research on the dynamics of conflict and cooperation among (ideologically similar) rebel groups and thus political violence in general.