Since the global financial crisis of 2008/9, the European Union has upgraded its economic governance capabilities considerably. The so-called European Semester provides continuous surveillance of fiscal and macroeconomic indicators. To ensure adequate coordination of economic policies, the EU issues ‘Country-Specific Recommendations’ (CSRs) that outline which reforms member states should pursue.
One of the puzzles posed by the Semester is that it does not seem to be equally effective in all member states. Some countries regularly implement their CSRs while others all but ignore them. What explains the difference? This article investigates whether the characteristics of reform recommendations, rather than domestic politics or the economic environment, drive implementation rates. To this end, I adapt theories of Europeanisation and the political economy of external adjustment. I analyze an original dataset of all CSRs issued between 2012 and 2017 that codes recommendations according to their legal basis, policy area and ideological direction.
